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There is now very little, if any, doubt that the global climate is changing and that this is in
some way related to human behavior through unsustainable preferences in lifestyle and
organizational practices. Despite the near conclusive evidence of the positive relationship
between greenhouse gas emissions and global warming, a small proportion of people
remain unconvinced. More importantly, even among the much larger number of people
who accept a link between human behavior and climate change, many are inactive, or
insufﬁciently active, in attempting to remedy the situation. We suggest this is partly
because people are unaware both of how their day-to-day behaviors connect with energy
consumption and carbon emissions, and of the behavioral alternatives that are available
to them. This, we believe, is a key reason why individual lifestyles and organizational
practices continue in an unsustainable way. We also suggest that the psychologists
and behavioral researchers who seek to develop a better understanding of people’s
relationship with, and reaction to, environmental issues, might also be on track to suffer a
similar blindness. They risk becoming ﬁxed on investigating a limited range of established
variables, perhaps to the detriment of alternative approaches that are more practically
oriented though, so far, less well explored empirically. In this article, we present the
Framework for Internal Transformation as an alternative perspective on the variables that
might underpin pro-environmental activity and behavior change. After brieﬂy reviewing the
related literature, we outline that framework.Then we present some early empirical data to
show its relationship to a range of pro-environmental indices.We follow with a discussion
of the framework’s relevance in relation to pro-environmental behavior change and make
proposals for future research.
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INTRODUCTION
There is now very little, if any, doubt regarding the connec-
tion between human behavior, carbon emissions, and changes to
the world’s climate. The scientiﬁc evidence surrounding climate
change has grown considerably over the past three decades fol-
lowing the UN Conference on the Changing Atmosphere in 1988.
More recently, a report compiled by an international consortium
of scientists, the largest of its kind to date, has suggested that
the large majority of climate researchers agree that human activ-
ity is contributing to global warming (Doran and Zimmerman,
2009; IPCC, 2013). To quote, the UN’s climate-panel scien-
tists are 95% certain that humans are the “dominant cause” of
global warming since the 1950s. Cumulatively, there is a clear
message emanating from the scientiﬁc evidence: there is a sig-
niﬁcant relationship between changes to the climate and human
behavior, as reﬂected in lifestyle preferences and organizational
practices.
Despite the increasing scientiﬁc evidence it seems that a large
majority of people still remain either unaware, in denial, or oth-
erwise disengaged with the problem of climate change. This is
reﬂected in the fact that UK energy consumption relating to trans-
portation and households has continued to rise in recent years
(DEFRA, 2006; notwithstanding some small drops recently, largely
as a result of the ﬁnancial recession). The IPCC (2013) suggests
that human behavior is responsible for more than half of the
observed increases in the climate. Elsewhere, it is also reported
that only a minority of people are taking action to mitigate the
effect (Whitmarsh, 2009). This means that for most individuals,
daily life continues in a way that is unsustainable.
There are a variety of broadly psychological questions – that
is, questions relating to human cognition, affect, and behav-
ior – that arise in relation to climate change and sustainability.
Do people have a realistic awareness of the scientiﬁc evidence
showing the connection between human behavior in general and
changes to the earth’s climate? If so, how does this make them
feel and act? How aware are people of the effects of their own
personal behavior and how this behavior might itself be unsus-
tainable? In this regard, how aware are people of the alternative
behavioral options that are available to them? And how will-
ing and capable are people of changing their behavior in the
cause of improved sustainability (explicitly acknowledging here
the distinct difference between willingness and capability)? It is
clear that these questions, and the answers to them, present a
set of interrelated challenges to researchers who seek to better
understand the relationship between people and their changing
environment.
In this paper, we are not primarily interested in exploring pro-
environmental behavior change in thosewho, notwithstanding the
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scientiﬁc near-consensus, are either skeptical or outright hostile
to any posited link between human activity and climate change.
According to ﬁgures from various sources (Spence et al., 2010;
YouGov, 2013), around 5% of UK adults do not believe that cli-
mate change is a real phenomenon at all, with a further 20% or so
believing that, while climate change is real, it is primarily caused by
natural processes other than human activity. Lewandowsky et al.
(2013a,b) have investigated members of this skeptical minority in
relation, for instance, to their political views and to their concomi-
tant rejection of other scientiﬁc consensuses (see also, Specter,
2009). The conclusions of Lewandowsky et al. (2013a,b) lead us
to think it unlikely that a signiﬁcant proportion of this minority
will be susceptible any time soon to pro-environmental psycho-
logical interventions. (Indeed, any attempt along these lines is
likely to be regarded as sinister and, if anything, to have the oppo-
site of its intended effect.) For this reason, this paper focusses
on how psychological interventions might assist the majority of
people who accept anthropogenic climate change, and the closely
related majority (55–60%, according to Thornton, 2009; Spence
et al., 2010, respectively) who would like to do more to help the
environment. Given the ﬁgures, we believe that any public policy
would do well to have the same focus.
Among themajority who accept the existence of climate change
and its relationship with human behavior, we suggest that one
of the primary challenges for practical pro-environmental behav-
ior change is a lack of attention and/or awareness, with this lack
evident at two related levels. Dealing with attention ﬁrst, people
are very often sufﬁciently focused on activities related to their
core proximal goals that they pay little or no attention to the
environmental consequences of those activities, these being of
secondary concern at best. For example, drawing on the sec-
ond author’s experience of advising small companies on ways
to cut their carbon emissions, the ﬁrst challenge was often tem-
porarily to draw attention away from the core business goal (i.e.,
generating products for market) and toward non-core aspects
of a given business (such as the energy used for lighting and
heating), aspects which nonetheless had a substantial effect on
costs as well as environmental credentials. Without clients’ atten-
tion being so diverted, even temporarily, it was difﬁcult even to
begin a conversation about pro-environmental behavior. We have
referred previously (Page and Page, 2011) to this fundamental
attentional problem as being somewhat akin to what is called,
in the perceptual and cognitive domain, ‘inattentional blindness.’
The mapping is not perfect, however, as wasted energy, say, is not
literally present in the visual ﬁeld. What is important though is
to establish environmental concerns in the “attentional set” of the
target audience for behavior change. Naturally, in circumstances
where the consequences to an individual or organization of, for
example, wasted energy are dramatic - such as when the cost of
energy is extremely high – then there is an increased chance that
attention is drawn to the otherwise unattended problem, in as
much as the core goal (e.g., proﬁt making) is directly affected.
At present, it does not seem that increased carbon emissions
are associated with sufﬁciently negative consequences to make
them a sufﬁciently salient dimension of everyday activities. For
example, for the richest decile of UK residents, the decile for
whom personal carbon emissions are the highest, energy costs
make up only 3.5% of their domestic expenditure, a percentage
clearly insufﬁcient to draw attention and to promote action (Vaze,
2009).
Second, regarding awareness, even once attention has been
drawn toward issues of environmental concern, there is very
often a lack of awareness/knowledge regarding the measures
that could plausibly be taken to ameliorate the position. Tak-
ing again the example of a small business, one’s attention might
be drawn to the high cost of lighting, but without both an
awareness of potential alternatives and knowledge relating to
the cost- and energy-saving consequences of each, signiﬁcant
behavior change is unlikely to occur. In previous work (Page
and Page, 2011), we referred to this process of drawing atten-
tion to unattended problems and proposing viable solutions as
the opportunities component of what we called the HOT top-
ics of pro-environmental behavior change (Habits Opportunities
Thoughts).
For people who are, in principle, open to change, another
important aspect to consider is their personal belief that they
are even capable of changing their behavior – an individual’s
level of self-efﬁcacy (Bandura, 1994). This is important, as the
extent to which they believe that their speciﬁc efforts will be suc-
cessful helps determine people’s behavioral motivation. Without
sufﬁcient self-efﬁcacy, people might avoid attempting a speciﬁc
behavioral change because they do not believe they are capable
of its successful implementation. For this reason, we, among oth-
ers (see below) suggest that a second key step in any intervention
seeking to encourage pro-environmental behavior change involves
developing intrinsic beliefs relating to self-efﬁcacy so that people
feel conﬁdent and empowered to take a different course of action.
It is not only “other people” who need to be attentive to
alternative courses of action. Those psychologists and behav-
ioral researchers who seek to develop a better understanding
of pro-environmental behavior (and we include ourselves in
this designation) might also need to broaden their attentional
set. Based on a review of the literature on models of pro-
environmental behavior and frameworks for pro-environmental
behavior change (summarized below and reported in more
detail elsewhere; see Page, in preparation), we suggest that
a large majority of the theoretical and empirical research on
pro-environmental behavior has become rather ﬁxated on inves-
tigating, further investigating, and micro-reﬁning a somewhat
limited range of established variables, perhaps to the detriment of
alternative approaches. Environmental researchers are, it seems,
liable to become inattentive to novel approaches to behavior
change in general, and to pro-environmental behavior change in
particular.
With this inmind,we present below a preliminary investigation
of a relatively novel framework for behavior change – called the
Framework for Internal Transformation (FIT; Fletcher and Stead,
2000) – as it relates to pro-environmental action. In so doing,
we organize the paper in the following way. First, we start by
outlining some of the popular and empirically established frame-
works relating to pro-environmental behavior that have placed
emphasis on affective, cognitive, and behavioral dimensions. We
consider the relative success that these psychological and behav-
ioral approaches have enjoyed in the past. We then suggest that the
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net be cast rather wider in the search for psychological techniques
that might usefully be applied in this domain and present the
FIT Framework as a possible alternative approach that might have
relevance in this domain. We then consider the applicability of
FIT to pro-environmental behavior and present some preliminary
empirical data. Based on the empirical insights offered by this early
research, we consider the relevance of a FIT-based intervention for
pro-environmental behavior change more generally.
REVIEW OF PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO PRO-ENVIRONMENTAL
BEHAVIOR CHANGE
There aremultiple and distinct types of pro-environmental behav-
ior that have been considered from a variety of theoretical
perspectives. These include environmental activism; non-activist
public behaviors such as environmental citizenship or support and
acceptance of public policies; private environmental activism; and
environmental behavior in organizations (Stern, 2000). Several
psychological theories and behavioral models have been designed
speciﬁcally to explain the different types of pro-environmental
behavior and efforts at pro-environmental behavior change [e.g.,
the Value-Belief-Norm Theory (VBN), Stern, 2000]. There are
also other models of behavior that are more generic in nature and
were ﬁrst designed to explain behavior of other types, before being
applied to pro-environmental activity [e.g., the Theory of Planned
Behavior (TPB), Ajzen, 1991].
Regardless of their origin, the models each place a different
emphasis on the factors that might inﬂuence pro-environmental
behavior. Overall, they have often reﬂected two main types.
The ﬁrst type places greater emphasis on individual agency and
the individual as the locus of behavior. From this perspective,
behavior is perceived as an outcome of competing inﬂuences
that are decided upon by the individual, typically in a balanced
and rational way. Accordingly, behavior is largely determined
by the strength of inﬂuence of an individual’s personal affec-
tive, cognitive, and/or behavioral characteristics and (perceived)
competencies. In contrast, the second type of model is focused
more on the social and physical context in which the behavior
might occur. Approaches of this type place greater emphasis on
the role of contextual and extrinsic factors that are, to a greater
extent, perceived to be outside of individual control [e.g., Social
Practice Theory (SPT), Hargreaves, 2011]. There are, of course,
theories and models that sit astride these two camps and empha-
size the interplay of both individual characteristics and contextual
forces (e.g., the Comprehensive Action Determination Model;
Klöckner and Blöbaum, 2010). However, despite such interac-
tions being acknowledged in the theoretical frameworks that seek
to explain pro-environmental behavior, we would argue that the
signiﬁcance of these interactions has often been underplayed
in the models that seek to support pro-environmental behavior
change.
Two popular psychological models of pro-environmental
behavior that place greater emphasis on the role of individual char-
acteristics are the Norm Activation Theory (NAT; Schwartz, 1977)
and the VBN (Stern, 2000). The former was originally designed to
explain altruistic and helping behaviors but in recent years it has
been applied more widely to pro-environmental behaviors; this
followed the conceptualization of such behaviors as moral acts
that are determined by a sense of what it is right or wrong to do
(Thøgersen, 1996). In contrast, the VBN approach was designed
speciﬁcally to explain pro-environmental behaviors. In terms of
their similarities, both the NAT and the VBN emphasize the inﬂu-
enceof affect, values andbeliefs indeterminingpro-environmental
behavior.
According to the NAT, pro-environmental behavior occurs
when people feel morally obliged to act in a given situation, based
on the activation of a personal norm. The triggers to norm acti-
vation include: an awareness of the need for help; an awareness
of the consequences of behavior; felt ascription of responsibility;
and sufﬁcient perceived behavior control to perform the action.
Consistent with our previous characterization, the ﬁrst two of
these variables are dependent on an individual’s cognitive aware-
ness not only of the need to act but also of the consequences
of various actions. The third variable describes the strength of
the affective relationship or a personal motivation to act, while
the fourth can be described as an individual’s perception of their
ability to act, as reﬂected in their perceived level of self-efﬁcacy
(Schwartz, 1977).
For theVBN, the strength of personal biospheric, altruistic, and
egoistic beliefs underpins pro-environmental behavior. The VBN
theory is a more inclusive framework than the NAT, as it identiﬁes
the attitudinal factors and personal capabilities of individuals, as
well as the inﬂuence of contextual forces and habits. According to
VBN, the causal chain starts with the strength of an individual’s
core beliefs, values and norms, which determine an individual’s
overall predisposition to act with pro-environmental intent. Three
different types of value are identiﬁed: biospheric – a strong connec-
tion to the natural world; altruistic – a strong connection to other
people; and egoistic – a strong connection to self. The strength of
biospheric beliefs inﬂuences personal considerations with respect
to the interconnectedness between human activity and the bio-
sphere (cf. the New Ecological Paradigm; Dunlap et al., 2000).
These might, in turn, lead to a personal motivation to avoid
adverse environmental consequences, as is evident in the will-
ing majority described above. However, in order to take action, an
individual must feel that they are capable of worthwhile action,
even though this perception might be at odds with their actual
behavioral capabilities. Again, though, it is acknowledged that an
individual’s attentional set and their personal level of self-efﬁcacy
are important in moving an individual from affect to action.
In addition to personal beliefs, the inﬂuence of habit is also
acknowledged in the VBN theory (Stern, 2000). Habits are likely
tohave a signiﬁcant impact on thedegree towhichpeople are aware
and are capable of taking action. Research has shown that when
behaviors become characteristic of habit, they are directed less
by conscious awareness and intentions and more directed by cues
in the context (Triandis, 1977; Ouellette and Wood, 1998; Bargh
and Chartrand, 1999). Several pro-environmental behaviors have
also been reported as having habit characteristics. For example,
Danner et al. (2008) found that people who cycle regularly had
highly accessible representations of cycling that were independent
of their intentions to cycle. As such, behaviorwas performed some-
what automatically and relatively independently from cognitions.
As well as inﬂuencing behavior directly, habits can also suppress
the consideration of alternative behavioral options. For example,
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in an earlier study, Danner et al. (2007) found that the mental
accessibility of habits increases with repetition and goes hand-
in-hand with an inhibition of competing alternatives. In essence,
when behavior becomes guided by habit, the behavior itself can
happen automatically rather than intentionally, with alternatives
barely considered.
The considerable amount of empirical research that has
explored pro-environmental behavior and behavior change from
the perspectives of the NAT and VBN theories has suggested
that these models are more limited in explaining repetitive pro-
environmental behaviors such as travel mode choice and recycling
behaviors (see Stern, 2000; Hunecke et al., 2001; Harland et al.,
2007). It appears, again, that pro-environmental behaviors can
be guided more by habit rather than intention, perhaps help-
ing to account for the value-action gap that is often reported in
pro-environmental behavior research (Blake, 1999).
The role of habit in determining behavior has also been largely
overlooked in models of behavior that emphasize the inﬂuence
of cognitions. The TPB (Ajzen, 1991) is one of the most popu-
lar cognitive models of behavior. It was ﬁrst developed to explain
personal health behavior but has more recently been developed
and applied to the domain of pro-environmental activity (see
Donald et al., 2014). The model speciﬁes three antecedent deter-
minants of behavior, which have an indirect effect on behavior
through their inﬂuence on behavior intention. The determinants
are: attitudes toward the behavior, which reﬂect beliefs about
the behavior and an evaluation of its expected outcomes; sub-
jective norms, which reﬂect beliefs about the perceived social
pressure to perform or not perform the behavior and an indi-
vidual’s motivation to comply; and perceived behavioral control,
which reﬂects beliefs about one’s capability and control to per-
form the behavior. The model suggests that favorable attitudes
and subjective norms, coupled with perceptions of behavioral
control, lead to strong behavioral intentions and, in turn,
behavior.
The TPB model has been successfully applied to a range of
different pro-environmental behavior intentions for both direct
behaviors such as recycling (Cheung et al., 1999) and transport
mode use (Donald et al., 2014), and indirect behaviors such as
environmental activism (Fielding et al., 2008) and, more speciﬁ-
cally, opposition to wind farm development (Read et al., 2013). It
has also been successfully applied to pro-environmental behavior
intentions in the workplace (Fielding et al., 2005; Greaves et al.,
2013) though, overall, organizational settings have warranted far
less empirical research and might pose different challenges for
pro-environmental behavior compared with those encountered in
a home context. In essence, the TPB is well supported in the pro-
environmental domain. It has received and continues to receive,
extensive empirical support.
TheTPB is, however, notwhollywithout limitations. Oneprob-
lem concerns the ability of the model to predict actual behavior
rather than behavioral intention. In line with the original model
speciﬁcation, much of the empirical research to date has explored
the predictive value of the TPB toward behavioral intention rather
than to behavior itself. The two are not the same. The predictive
value of the TPB is substantially weaker for behavior compared
to behavioral intention. In a meta-analytic review, Armitage and
Conner (2001) found a 12% difference, from 27 to 39%, in
explained variance between behavior and behavioral intention.
As intimated above, the presence of habits is one factor that might
account for this disparity. People do not do what they intend to do
simply because the strength of habit relating to existing behaviors
cannot be overcome by intentions alone. As with the value-action
gap, habits might go some way to accounting for the intention-
action gap that is also regularly reported in pro-environmental
behavior research (Klöckner and Blöbaum, 2010).
Aside from the potential intervention of habit between
intention and action, another limitation of TPB toward pro-
environmental behavior research is the absence of a truly practical
method for supporting people to change their behavior. TPB is a
more useful model for understanding the variables that determine
behavior than it is a framework for supporting pro-environmental
behavior change. Two models that offer greater opportunities for
better understanding and encouraging people’s susceptibility or
resistance to changing behavior are the Stages of Change (SoC)
model (Prochaska et al., 1992) and the more recent stage model of
self-regulated behavior change (SSBC; Bamberg, 2013).
The original SoC model deﬁnes behavior as being positioned
at one of ﬁve stages that are temporarily ordered and qualita-
tively different. These reﬂect an individual’s ‘level of motivational
readiness’ (Heimlich and Ardoin, 2008, p. 279). The ﬁve stages
are: (1) pre-contemplation – the individual is unaware of the
problem and has no intention to change behavior; (2) contem-
plation – the individual is aware of the problem and is seriously
considering changing behavior; (3) preparation – the individual
is ready to change and is intending to take action; (4) action –
the individual takes action to modify their behavior; and (5)
maintenance – following action, the individual works to avoid
relapse. Accordingly, a different intervention type is suggested for
each stage, as each stage is likely to present a different challenge
and hence to need a different approach (Nisbet and Gick, 2008).
It is suggested that movement between stages is driven by two
factors: an individual’s level of self-efﬁcacy and their decisional
balance, the latter reﬂecting the outcome of individual assess-
ment of the pros and cons of particular behaviors (Armitage et al.,
2004). It is possible to move backward and forward through the
stages.
In a similar way, the SSBC model (Bamberg, 2013), which
was designed speciﬁcally for pro-environmental behavior change,
deﬁnes four distinct qualitative stages through which behavior
change occurs. The ﬁrst three of these stages are based on a foun-
dation of cognitive awareness and intention. They are deﬁned as:
(1) pre-decisional – individuals consider competing wishes and
turn some of these into binding goals to form a goal intention.
Upon development of a goal intention the individual transits
to the second stage, (2) pre-actional, whereby a speciﬁc behav-
ior intention for guiding action is deliberated and decided upon.
Next, formation of the behavior intention moves the individual
to the third stage (3) actional and a narrowing down of behav-
ioral options to a speciﬁc behavior, which is formulated through
an implementation intention. Lastly, commitment to an imple-
mentation intention moves the individual to the (4) post-actional
stage whereby the new behavior is performed (Bamberg, 2011,
2013).
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Both the SSCB (Bamberg, 2013) and the SoC models
(Prochaska et al., 1992) offer promising approaches to leverag-
ing change in relation to pro-environmental behavior. A recent
application of the SSCB model to a social marketing campaign
showed greater effectiveness for encouraging car use reduction
in comparison to a standardized information package (Bamberg,
2013). Both models acknowledge and consider the blindness (in
our terms) that people might have toward the target problem
and in relation to their current behaviors. In the SSCB model
in particular, this is challenged directly by getting people to com-
mit to a goal intention. We see this as a signiﬁcant advantage
over the other models of behavior that we have described so far.
The SoC model also explicitly acknowledges the importance of
self-efﬁcacy for supporting people to move through the different
stages.
Although both the SoC and SSBC models offer promising
insights into the encouraging of pro-environmental behavior
change, others (see Morris et al., 2012) have suggested that they
might be too egoistical in their approach, in as much as the models
miss or underplay the inﬂuence of structural economic, environ-
mental, and social factors that could also inﬂuence performance
of pro-environmental behaviors. An alternative approach offered
by the SPT (see Shove, 2010; Hargreaves, 2011) places greater
emphasis on extrinsic factors and how these might inﬂuence
pro-environmental behavior and behavior change. In particu-
lar, the SPT theory considers how behaviors are embedded in
the structures of everyday life, in the routine performances of
social practices such as cooking, driving, washing, and shopping.
From this perspective, behaviors, whether they are pro- or anti-
environmental, become embedded within social practices (Warde,
2005) and, in turn, are perceived by people as being “normal
ways of life” (Shove, 2004, p. 117). Through the exposure and
repetition of social practices in day-to-day life, behavioral sets
develop and become associated with different practices. Subse-
quently, behaviors are no longer determined by an individual’s
personal competencies and intentions (as per NAM, VBN, TPB),
but individuals become, instead, ‘carriers’ of social practices and
thus become ‘performers’ of the behaviors that are required by the
practice (Reckwitz, 2002). In essence, people develop behavioral
habits and routines that are congruent with their environmen-
tal circumstances. As a consequence, people’s awareness of their
actions might be lowered, a factor that we identiﬁed above as
a key barrier to behavior change. The structure that embedded
social practices offer might, of course, be advantageous once
pro-environmental behaviors are established. In essence, the rel-
atively stable routinization of daily life enables people to perform
pro-environmental behaviors somewhat automatically, without
overexertion of conscious decision-making processes.
Empirical research has supported this characterization. Trans-
port choice is perhaps the best researched of the areas in which
automatic action is cited as a negative environmental factor;
speciﬁcally, the near automatic favoring of the private car over
public-transport alternatives is frequently attributed to the force of
habit (e.g.,Dahlstrand andBiel,1997;Verplanken et al.,1997,2008;
Klöckner and Matthies, 2004; Davidov, 2007). One can imagine,
too, that the unnecessary turning on (and leaving on) of lights or
of heating systems, the disposal (rather than recycling) of waste,
or the unnecessary use of water, would all be under the inﬂuence
of habits, rather than being driven by the more rational consider-
ation proposed in the NAT (Schwartz, 1977), VBN (Stern, 2000),
and TPB (Ajzen, 1991) theories. Again, habits are not necessar-
ily environmentally deleterious: one might equally well be in the
habit of cycling to work, turning lights off and dutifully recycling.
Nonetheless, the environmental problems with which we are cur-
rently faced suggest that these ‘good’ habits are not yet the norm
and that environmentally deleterious habits pervade.
HABITUAL THINKING
So far in this article we have identiﬁed attention/awareness, self-
efﬁcacy, and behavioral habits as important considerations in
the ﬁeld of pro-environmental activity. We have suggested that
both individuals and researchers might be prone to inatten-
tional and habitual action, and that this might suppress their
abilities to engage effectively with the problems that climate
change presents. Up to now our attention on habit has been
focused on behavior: we have considered how behavioral habits
might support or impede pro-environmental activity in day-to-
day life and have considered how habits might separate action
from values, affect, and cognition. Next we brieﬂy consider the
process of habit development and how this might impede or
support pro-environmental activity. In so doing, we further con-
sider the connection between cognition, affect and behavior, and
describe how cognitions and affect can themselves be habitual in
character.
As well as their inﬂuence on behaviors, habits can also mani-
fest in the way people think and feel. For example, in relation to
the purchase of environmentally friendly detergents, Dahlstrand
and Biel (1997) identiﬁed seven key steps in the development of
an environmentally benign habit. These were: (1) activation (i.e.,
attending to the environment as a value); (2) attending to present
behavior; (3) consideration of alternative behaviors; (4) planning
new behavior; (5) testing new behavior; (6) evaluation of new
behavior; and (7) establishment of new habit. Alongside each of
these steps, they postulated factors that could either impedeor pro-
mote progress at that point. It is notable that the ﬁrst of Dahlstrand
and Biel’s (1997) seven steps comes under the general heading of
attentiveness and supports the notion that many people simply do
not attend to, and are hence not aware of, their behavior. This lack
of awareness could certainly impede attempts to change behavior,
particularly as people under its inﬂuence might never progress to
the latter stages of the new-habit-forming process. For the third
step (the consideration of alternative behaviors), Dahlstrand and
Biel (1997) also identiﬁed ‘negative beliefs about alternatives’ as
an impeding factor, while the presence of ‘evident, existing alter-
natives’ was considered a promoting factor at this level. In this
model, therefore, beliefs potentially constrain both the range of
alternative behaviors that are considered and the way in which
those alternatives are conceived.
In a previous discussion of the role of beliefs in behavior
change (Page and Page, 2011), we drew a parallel with the role
that beliefs are considered to play in therapeutic settings informed
by Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) theory. CBT theory is
inﬂuenced by the Greek philosopher Epictetus, who famously
wrote that, “Men [sic] are not disturbed by things, but by the
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view that they take of them.” In the CBT conception, it is
not events in the world that directly cause emotional or other
disturbance. It is, instead, the thoughts/beliefs that an individ-
ual has about those events that intervene between events and
feelings, and play a causal role in affecting the latter. In rela-
tion to automatic beliefs in pro-environmental behavior change,
there is, we suggest, an analogous situation: the activation of
just one negative environmental thought is enough to block
entirely a change in behavior, even if that thought represents a
cognitively distorted perspective on the world. For this reason,
we suggest that close attention to thoughts, and in particular
those negative thoughts that leap automatically to mind, is likely
to be a necessary component of successful pro-environmental
intervention.
We have highlighted the inﬂuence of cognitive, affective, and
behavioral habits on pro-environmental behavior and behav-
ior change. We propose that researchers need to take more
serious consideration of the constraints that habits and behav-
ioral inﬂexibility place on human action and the possibilities
of change, this to include a willingness on the part of the
researchers themselves (ourselves) to exhibit more ﬂexibility in
their (our) own investigations. In the spirit of this recom-
mendation, therefore, in what follows we consider the FIT
framework (Fletcher and Stead, 2000) as an alternative model
of behavior that is explicitly accompanied by an associated
framework of behavior change. By way of contrast with the
models described above, FIT is a model that does, to a certain
extent, consider the potential impact of cognitive and behav-
ioral habits on pro-environmental behavior and behavior-change
efforts, by explicitly measuring behavioral ﬂexibility. The FIT
framework has not been tried and tested in relation to pro-
environmental activity, in the way that many of the preceding
approaches have been. Nonetheless, we are currently undertak-
ing empirical work to assess its value in this ﬁeld. There follows
a description of the FIT behavioral framework and our ﬁrst
empirical evaluation of its relationship with pro-environmental
behavior.
THE FIT FRAMEWORK
The FIT framework (Fletcher and Stead, 2000) comprises a col-
lection of psychometrically validated tools (principally, the FIT
Proﬁler; Fletcher, 1999) and a variety of behavioral interventions
(principally, a Do Something Different programme). At its incep-
tion FIT, which is an acronym for Framework for Internal
Transformation, was proposed as a framework to understand
personal effectiveness in decision-making and behavior. It was
offered as a theoretical framework for understanding the differ-
ences between people in how they cope with the situations they
encounter (Fletcher and Stead, 2000). In line with this, much of
the early research on FIT was focused on personal strain levels
(e.g., see Fletcher, 1991). FIT is formulated around a frame-
work of cognitive and behavioral competencies and strengths
that, it is suggested, guide an individual’s perceptions of dif-
ferent situations and the demands that associate with these. In
particular, the framework focuses on ﬁve cognitive competen-
cies; also named Constancies, and the degree of ﬂexibility across
15 behavioral dimensions, termed behavioral ﬂexibility. These
dimensions are perceived signiﬁcantly to inﬂuence an individ-
ual’s decision-making processes and their execution of behavioral
choices.
Framework for Internal Transformation theory acknowledges
that behavior and thinking-style can both be prone to inﬂexibil-
ity and habit. Unlike other models of behavior, FIT emphasizes
the idea that for maximum effectiveness one would not want
to be located at any given point along a particular behavioral
dimension. Instead, it is suggested that individuals should be
comfortable operating at widely dispersed points along the dimen-
sion, so as to display the ﬂexibility that is required to cope
effectively and efﬁciently in different circumstances. To give
an example, using a dimension of Introversion–Extroversion:
FIT theory emphasizes that rather than seeking to locate one’s
“character” at a particular point along this dimension, the vary-
ing demands of the real world would recommend ﬂexibility,
that is, sometimes being introverted, sometimes extroverted,
as the occasion requires. The enhancement of such ﬂexibil-
ity is intended, therefore, to counteract habitual, unaware
behavior.
The FIT Proﬁler (Fletcher, 1999) measures the 15 behavioral
dimensions deﬁned by the FIT framework, and speciﬁcally mea-
sures the degree of ﬂexibility in each (see Table 1). It also measures
the ﬁve cognitive Constancies (Awareness, Balance, Conscience,
Fearlessness, Self-Responsibility; see Table 2), in acknowledg-
ment that thinking-style too can be prone to inﬂexibility and
habit. The behavioral dimensions are deﬁned by Fletcher and
Table 1 | Dimensions of Behavioral Flexibility measured by the FIT Profiler.
Pole 1 Pole 2 Pole 1 Pole 2
Assertive V Unassertive Behave as I wish V Behave as others expect
Conventional V Unconventional Systematic V Spontaneous
Cautious V Trusting Open-minded V Single-minded
Predictable V Unpredictable Extroverted V Introverted
Energetic/Driven V Calm/relaxed Deﬁnite V Flexible
Reactive V Proactive Lively V Not lively
Group orientated V Individually orientated Gentle V Firm
Risk taker V Cautious
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Table 2 | Cognitive Constancies measured by the FIT Profiler.
Constancy Item
Awareness Are you always clear as to why you did
something or are you often surprised?
Balance When at work is your mind on other things?
Conscience Do you believe you have to tell lies to
succeed?
Fearlessness Do fearful feelings stop you from doing
things you want to do?
Self-Responsibility Do you feel in control?
Stead (2000) as providing the ‘blueprint’ that allows individuals
to behave effectively and ﬂexibly across different situations. The
behaviors are not considered as ﬁxed traits but as competencies
that are trainable and can be developed. The FIT Proﬁler measures
such behavioral ﬂexibility and directs its development.
Fletcher and Stead (2000, p. 22) suggest that most people
will have a “comfort zone” on each behavioral dimension. It is
likely that this will reﬂect personal preferences and the way in
which someone typically behaves in a given situation; in other
words, it reﬂects their habitual tendencies. FIT theory acknowl-
edges that as well as identifying personal preferences in each
of the cognitive and behavioral dimensions, it is also impor-
tant to offer a framework to encourage behavior change and
personal development. The purpose of the associated FIT-Do
Something Different (DSD) intervention is to expand the size of
personal ‘comfort zones’ so that these exceed the“discomfort zone”
(Fletcher and Stead, 2000, p. 22). People might, therefore, be bet-
ter equipped to behave appropriately and ﬂexibly in accordance
with circumstance, and as guided by their conscious cognitions
(Constancies).
Fletcher and Stead (2000) describe the cognitive Constancies
as underpinning action. Furthermore, they suggest that if the
Constancies are aligned at similar levels, they are more likely to
guide decision-making and behavior that is effective and accords
with current circumstance and personalized goals, rather than
simply being driven by force of habit. Like Behavioral Flexibil-
ity, the cognitive Constancies are described as trainable. They can
be strengthened and developed. There are ﬁve Constancies (see
Table 2) and it is plausible that each has a role to play in deter-
mining pro-environmental behavior and driving efforts toward
pro-environmental behavior change.
Having high levels of Awareness, which by deﬁnition is the
degree to which an individual monitors and attends to their exter-
nal and internal world, can be thought of as an antidote to
being a habit-machine. It is about being awake and monitoring
internal and external states and using feedback to guide actions,
thoughts, and feelings. In relation to pro-environmental behavior
and change, we suggest that individuals who have a higher level
of Awareness will also be more aware of issues relating to climate
change, the degree of sustainability in their personal lifestyle, the
impact of their current behaviors, and the possibilities of change
to become more pro-environmental.
The Balance Constancy is described as the ability of people to
ensure every aspect of life receives due care and attention so that
each part, be it work, non-work or self, is in-sync and that no one
dominates. Accordingly, a person who scores high on Balance is
able to prioritize different aspects of their life and allocate cog-
nitive and behavioral resources toward these in accordance with
demand. In relation to sustainability, a person with a low level of
Balancemight compromise this aspect of their lifestyle, potentially
resulting in aspects of pro-environmental activity being pushed
aside and excluded in the cognitions or behaviors of daily life.
In contrast, individuals with higher levels of Balance might con-
sider issues relating to sustainability as a priority alongside others,
with the consequence that pro-environmental behavior is more
prominent in their daily life.
The third Constancy is Conscience. This is described as the
moral compass for decision-making and behavior. Conscience
allows people to differentiate right from wrong and act on doing
the right thing. It might then follow that an individual with a
high level of Conscience will endeavor to make every decision
an ethically and morally correct one. Fletcher and Stead (2000)
suggest that individuals who have a high level of Conscience will
never compromise morals in order to achieve an external goal.
By plausible extension, individuals with higher levels of Con-
science might feel more connected with issues of sustainability
and therefore become engaged, both cognitively and behaviorally,
with pro-environmental activity.
The fourth Constancy identiﬁed in the FIT framework is Fear-
lessness. Negative emotions such as fear and anxiety have been
identiﬁed as barriers to action in several models of health behav-
ior (see, e.g., Beck, 1967). When fear is particularly high it can
restrict many aspects of daily life and can skew rational thought
and action; excessive levels of fear can cause phobias. Fear can
often be the main driver of behavior and the decisions people
make. The FIT framework conceives fear as the emotional lim-
iter of behavior that keeps people within their comfort zones,
doing the things they have always done. It acknowledges that
the inﬂuence of fear on people’s actions, choices and decisions
might be unconscious, or, if felt, to be too powerful to over-
come. As a consequence, FIT suggests that people stick to ‘safe’
patterns of behavior. In contrast, Fearlessness is achieved when
people, to a signiﬁcant degree, disconnect emotion from decision-
making. Fearlessness supports individuals to act outside of their
behavioral comfort zone, in accordance with their personal wants
and desires. A sufﬁcient level of Fearlessness might be necessary
to encourage people to embed pro-environmental activities into
their lifestyles, particularly if there are external barriers such as
social norms that run counter to the desired actions. Higher levels
of Fearlessness might give people the conﬁdence to experiment
with new and different ways of behaving, without the fear of
failure.
The FIT framework (Fletcher and Stead, 2000) describes the
Self-Responsibility Constancy as the barometer for measuring the
extent to which an individual takes charge of their life and accepts
responsibility for their actions and the things that happen to them,
regardless of factors outside of their control. It is suggested that
an individual who is self-responsible, will shape his or her own
world. They will not believe in luck and chance, nor will they
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blame external factors for the things that happen to them. Accord-
ingly, an individual who is self-responsible takes an active role in
shaping their world so that it suits them. In relation to sustain-
ability, it might be that an individual’s level of Self-Responsibility
will inﬂuence their felt level of personal responsibility to do some-
thing to reduce their environmental impact. Having a high level of
Self-Responsibility might strengthen the level of personal respon-
sibility that an individual feels toward climate change and their
personal contributions to it. This, in turn, might help initiate
pro-environmental action.
As described above, the strength of an individual’s Constan-
cies and their degree of Behavioral Flexibility might be separately
important for determining the level of pro-environmental activ-
ity in personal lifestyles. In addition, the connectedness between
both dimensions might also be an important consideration.
The FIT Framework (Fletcher and Stead, 2000) emphasizes a
bi-directional connection between people’s cognitions and their
behavior. It suggests that Constancies can guide effective and ﬂex-
ible decision-making behavior and, in return, the experiences that
are encountered can, through behavioral feedback, help to develop
the Constancies further. The strength of this bidirectional rela-
tionship, particularly the effect of actions on thoughts, has often
been underplayed in other models of behavior and frameworks
for behavior change.
As noted previously, the FIT framework suggests that the
cognitive Constancies provide the foundation for action; they
guide decision-making and behavior. As such, they can act
as a direct or indirect target for behavior change interven-
tions. A direct approach to change would seek to develop
the strength of each Constancy in order to lever changes in
behavior. This is the approach supported by most existing psy-
chological models of behavior and frameworks for behavior
change. However, as mentioned previously, this method does
not always result in new patterns of behavior and can result
in the thinking-action gap often seen (Klöckner and Blöbaum,
2010). An alternative approach would be to change cognitions
indirectly by developing behavior. According to this perspec-
tive, which subsumes an action-oriented approach, behavior is
targeted directly to leverage indirect changes in thinking. The
behavior change approach supported by the FIT framework, his-
torically called DSD, uses both an indirect and direct approach
to support behavior change. We suggest that in as much as
it simultaneously targets cognitions and behavior (i.e., behav-
ior independent of cognitions), the FIT framework might be
a useful alternative approach for pro-environmental behavior
change.
The FIT framework and DSD approach are novel perspectives
that have received limited empirical examination. The empir-
ical work that has been undertaken has mainly focused on
health-related outcomes such as stress, weight loss, and fam-
ily functioning (see Fletcher et al., 2011; Sharma, 2011). As far
as we are aware, this is the ﬁrst empirical study to explore
the relationship between FIT variables and pro-environmental
activity. Therefore, before we describe in detail the behav-
ior change framework associated with the FIT framework,
we ﬁrst need to establish if there any relationships between
FIT variables and pro-environmental activity and, if so, what
these might comprise. What follows, therefore, is a descrip-
tion of our ﬁrst empirical research exploring the relation-
ship between FIT variables and indices of pro-environmental
activity.
Based on our preceding rationale, we expect positive rela-
tionships between each of the FIT Constancies and cognitive
and behavioral measures of pro-environmental activity. We also
expect a positive relationship between Behavioral Flexibility and
pro-environmental activity. This is because individuals who are
more behaviorally ﬂexible are likely to be more capable of adapt-
ing to new challenges (such as climate change) and of developing
behavioral responses to mitigate their impact.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
As this is the ﬁrst empirical study that seeks to explore the rela-
tionships between FIT variables and pro-environmental activity,
we thought it would be useful to identify the relationships in a
sample that was as diverse as possible. With this intention in
mind, we used an online survey to capture the relationships in
a cross-section of participants that was obtained through a con-
venience sampling method. All respondents volunteered and gave
informed consent to participate in the research. They were assured
of the anonymity of the data they provided. The online survey was
composed of several scales (as described below), and although
they were not uncomplicated, responses suggested that respon-
dents had understood the instructions. The survey was open for
∼2-months during which time 431 respondents started the ques-
tionnaire and 325 completed it in full. This equated to a 75%
completion rate overall. Due to the possibility that the non-
completing respondents later returned to the questionnaire and
started to complete it a second time, data for the non-completers
were removed. Therefore the results are based on a sample of 325
respondents.
RESPONDENTS
Respondents in the study were 325 individuals [n = 87 (27%)
male; n = 237 (73%) female], ages ranged from 17 to 71 years
(M = 28.36, SD = 11.81). Two hundred and twenty four (69%)
respondents were of white-British origin; 58 (18%) were Asian;
12 (4%) were Black; 7 (2%) were Chinese; 7 (2%) were of
mixed race; and 8 (4%) other ethnicities. Regarding job type,
157 (48%) respondents were studying or in education; 47 (3%)
were in administrative/secretarial roles; 86 (26%) were in pro-
fessional roles; 22 (7%) were in managerial roles; 7 (2%) were
self-employed; and 5 (2%) were unemployed or not working.
One person did not report their type of work. Regarding high-
est educational qualiﬁcation, 6 (2%) respondents had a PhD;
37 (11%) had an MSc degree; 108 (33%) had a BSc degree;
162 (50%) had A-Levels; and 11 (4%) had GCSEs. One person
reported no educational qualiﬁcations. Respondents were self-
selecting volunteers to the research and formed an opportunity
sample.
We have described in detail here the characteristics of the sam-
ple. This is to give an indication of the diversity that was present.
These demographics were not used to make smaller group com-
parisons in the inferential analyses; this was not the intention of
this exploratory research.
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognitive Science November 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 1294 | 8
Page and Page Climate change: Do Something Different
MATERIALS
The scales in the online survey measured dimensions of pro-
environmental activity, personal FIT levels, and demographic
information, as follows.
Indicators of sustainability
We used three separate scales to measure respondents’ cognitive
and behavioral engagement with pro-environmental activity. The
three scales were systematically connected such that they each
separately assessed respondents’ pro-environmental thinking and
behavior on a similar range of pro-environmental activities. We
designed the survey in this way so that comparisons could bemade
between scores on the pro-environmental thinking and behavior
scales, and between reported performance of pro-environmental
behavior in different contexts.
The pro-environmental thinking scale measured cognitive
aspects of sustainability across 37 items by asking respon-
dents to rate the importance of a range of everyday pro-
environmental behaviors for protecting the environment (e.g.,
“recycling materials”) on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 (extremely
unimportant) to 7 (extremely important). Higher scores on
the scale (minimum = 37; maximum = 259) represented
stronger cognitive engagement with pro-environmental activ-
ity, that is, respondents were aware and thought that a larger
number of the behaviors were important for protecting the
environment.
The home pro-environmental behavior scale measured how
frequently respondents performed pro-environmental behaviors
in a home context. The scale was composed of 27 items, all
of which matched to the scale item on the pro-environmental
thinking scale. The items were measured on a 6-point scale
from 0 (never) to 5 (always). Higher scores on the scale (min-
imum = 0; maximum = 135) represented greater engagement
with pro-environmental behaviors in a home context.
The work pro-environmental behavior scale measured how fre-
quently respondents engaged in pro-environmental behaviors in
a work context. The scale was composed of 24 items, which were,
where possible, matched to items in the home pro-environmental
behavior and pro-environmental thinking scales. The items were
measured on a 6-point scale from 0 (never) to 5 (always). Higher
scores on the scale (minimum = 0; maximum = 120) represented
greater engagement with pro-environmental behaviors in a work
context.
In consideration of the inﬂuence of habit on behavior,
we thought it useful to include two scales to measure pro-
environmental behavior separately in home and work contexts.
This allowed us to explore whether there were any signiﬁcant
differences between pro-environmental activities at home and
work.
The FIT Proﬁler
A short version of the FIT Proﬁler (Page and Fletcher, 2006) was
used to measure personal levels of FITness. The shorter scale was
chosen to reduce the overall length of the online survey and to
align with the exploratory nature of the study. The full version of
the FIT Proﬁler is 75 items and would have signiﬁcantly added to
the survey completion time. The items included in this shortened
version were determined by a psychometric report produced by
Page and Fletcher (2006). The scale was composed of 20 items, 15
items measured Behavioral Flexibility and ﬁve items were used as
key indicators for each of the cognitive Constancies.
The Behavioral Flexibility scale measured the degree of ﬂex-
ibility in an individual’s behavioral repertoire. The scale was
composed of 15 bipolar items. Each item measured a different
dimension of behavior as described by the FIT framework, e.g.,
“proactive vs. reactive,”“extroverted vs. introverted” (see Table 1).
To complete the scale, respondents were instructed to indicate
their range of behavior (i.e., the size of their behavioral reper-
toire) on each item on an 11-point scale. The response scale
for each item represents the two extremes of the behavior in
question, with nine intermediate points. Respondents who are
behaviorally ﬂexible will indicate a large behavioral range across
all of the scale items. This would be shown by a response that
spans from one end of the scale to the other, encompassing all
11 points. In contrast, respondents who are less ﬂexible will indi-
cate a narrower response that is typically situated at one end of
the scale. The size of the range is recorded for each item and
this reﬂects an individual’s degree of ﬂexibility on the respec-
tive behavioral dimension. An overall Behavioral Flexibility score
is computed as a percentage from the range scores of the 15
items (minimum = 0; maximum = 100); a higher score indi-
cates a larger repertoire of behaviors, hence more Behavioral
Flexibility.
The cognitive Constancies of Awareness, Balance, Conscience,
Fearlessness, and Self-Responsibility were each measured by a
single item. The item used for each was determined in a previ-
ous study that identiﬁed the psychometric properties of the FIT
Proﬁler (Page and Fletcher, 2006). The strongest loading item
for each Constancy scale was used in this shortened version of
the scale. The Constancies were measured on a 0–10 scale with
higher scores equating to higher levels of Awareness, Balance,
Conscience, Fearlessness, and Self-Responsibility. A total score
of the individual Constancy scores was computed to reﬂect the
strength of FIT thinking. This is called FIT Integrity. Higher
scores show higher levels of each Constancy (minimum = 0;
maximum = 10) and overall FIT Integrity (minimum = 0;
maximum = 100).
The psychometric report produced by Page and Fletcher (2006)
identiﬁed the psychometric properties of the FIT Proﬁler in a sam-
ple of 1325. The results demonstrated good internal consistency
for the cognitive Constancies: Cronbach’s alpha values ranged
from lowest 0.67 (Self-Responsibility) to highest 0.87 (Fearless-
ness); FIT Integrity = 0.87; and Behavioral Flexibility = 0.91. The
test-re-test coefﬁcients ranged from 0.40 for Balance to 0.89 for
Overall FIT (a combined score of FIT Integrity and Behavioral
Flexibility).
Biographical and lifestyle questions
Respondents indicated their age; gender; ethnicity; highest edu-
cation qualiﬁcation; work/education status; and work/education
hours. This information was collected as background data to
inform the characteristics of the sample. It was not used to make
smaller group comparisons in the inferential analyses; this was not
the intention of this pilot research.
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DATA PREPARATION
Before proceeding with the data analysis we ﬁrst acknowledge the
self-report nature of the data and the possible implications of
this. A self-reported survey approach was selected for ease of cap-
turing a diverse sample for this pilot research. However, as with
any self-reported data collection method, there is the potential
that respondents might bias their responses toward social desir-
ability. The distortion might be more prevalent here because the
survey focuses on pro-environmental activity, a topic that has
been shown to be prone toward the inﬂuence of social desirability
(Schwarz, 1999).
The second limitation of using a self-report approach is that the
answers provided do not necessarily reﬂect reality. In other words,
the responses that respondents provide, particularly in relation to
behavior, might not be representative of how they actually behave
(see Huffman et al., 2014). This might be because respondents
are intentionally distorting their answers for social desirability
or because, as our reasoning throughout the paper has sug-
gested, people are simply unaware of some aspects of the way they
behave.
To mitigate these effects where possible, our analyses explored
the relationships amongst the scale variables using within-subjects
correlation analyses. In addition, the pro-environmental thinking
and behavior scales, which contained a different number of items,
were transformed to percentage scales prior to data analysis. The
results for each scale are presented on a 0–100 scale with lower
scores indicating lower levels of the variable measured.
RESULTS
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND RELIABILITIES
Considering the exploratory nature of this research and the nov-
elty of the scales used, the ﬁrst step was to check the descriptive
properties and reliabilities of the scales. Table 3 presents the
alpha coefﬁcient, mean, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis,
and other descriptive statistics for the pro-environmental activity
and FIT Proﬁler scales. Overall, the alpha coefﬁcients for the
pro-environmental activity scales were highly satisfactory, ranging
from 0.86 to 0.95 (M = 0.89). These results indicate substantial
internal consistency of the scales. The scales also had acceptable
(i.e.,<1.00) levels of skewness and kurtosis, suggesting no serious
deviations from normality.
Scores on the pro-environmental thinking scale were mod-
erate. This indicates that respondents believe that many of the
activities are important for protecting the environment. The
empirical scores distributed well across the theoretical scale (min-
imum = 0; maximum = 100). The home pro-environmental
behavior scores showed that, on average, respondents performed
some but not all of the pro-environmental activities. The mean
was situated just above the halfway position on the scale. Overall,
the empirical scores distributed well across the theoretical scale
(minimum = 0; maximum = 100). The work pro-environmental
behavior scores distributed to the upper- but not lower-end of the
theoretical distribution (minimum = 0; maximum = 100). This
suggests that all respondents performed at least some of the work
pro-environmental activities.
For the FIT Proﬁler, it was only possible to calculate alpha coef-
ﬁcients for scales composed of more than two items. The alpha
coefﬁcients for these scales were, in the main satisfactory, ranging
from 0.42 to 0.89 (M = 0.75). The alpha value for FIT Integrity
was low, however. This may well be expected when investigat-
ing psychological constructs (see Burch et al., 2008; Zibarras et al.,
2008), especially when they are measured using a limited number
of items (Rust and Golombok, 1999). As this scale was a reduced
version of the 50 item scale, and was composed of items measur-
ing different aspects of cognition, a lower alpha coefﬁcient was
not unexpected and should not be considered too concerning,
especially considering the diversity and limited number of items
included in the scale. The data had an acceptable (i.e.,<1.00) level
of skewness and kurtosis suggesting no serious deviations from
normality.
Table 3 | Descriptive statistics and reliabilities for the pro-environmental and FIT Profiler scales (N = 325).
95% CI
Scale α M SE LL UL Mdn Minimum Maximum SD Skewness Kurtosis
Thinking 0.95 69.10 0.71 67.71 70.49 68.00 5.00 100.00 12.73 –0.30 0.18
Home bvr 0.86 58.48 0.80 56.91 60.06 58.00 9.00 96.00 14.45 –0.11 –0.02
Work bvr 0.86 65.05 0.96 63.15 66.94 65.00 13.00 99.00 17.40 –0.37 –0.25
Integrity 0.42 56.19 0.82 54.56 57.82 56.00 16.00 98.00 14.92 0.01 –0.31
Awareness – 6.18 0.14 5.90 6.47 7.00 0.00 10.00 2.57 –0.37 –1.07
Balance – 4.30 0.15 4.01 4.59 4.00 0.00 10.00 2.65 0.26 –0.95
Conscience – 6.89 0.18 6.53 7.25 8.00 0.00 10.00 3.30 –0.81 –0.73
Fearlessness – 4.54 0.15 4.24 4.84 4.00 0.00 10.00 2.71 0.29 –0.90
S-Responsibility – 6.09 0.12 5.85 6.33 6.00 0.00 10.00 2.17 –0.40 –0.56
B-Flex 0.89 19.92 0.80 18.37 21.48 17.67 1.00 69.00 14.23 0.86 0.47
Thinking, pro-environmental thinking; Home bvr, home pro-environmental behavior; Work bvr, work pro-environmental behavior; S-Responsibility, Self-Responsibility;
B-Flex, Behavioral Flexibility.
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The Behavioral Flexibility scores were low and situated toward
the lower end of the theoretical distribution (minimum = 1;
maximum = 100). The FIT Integrity scores were moderate and
distributed evenly across the theoretical scale (minimum = 0;
maximum = 100). The scores did not reach the upper- or lower-
ends of the scale suggesting that no respondents had either very
poor or very high levels of Integrity.
Respondents reported lower levels of Balance and Fearless-
ness compared to the other Constancies. The variability of the
Constancies was similar, indicating that there were approxi-
mately equal variations for each. Overall, the Constancy scores
distributed evenly across the theoretical scales (minimum = 0;
maximum = 10).
The alpha coefﬁcients and descriptive statistics did, in themain,
conﬁrm the data suitable for parametric inferential analyses.
INTERCORRELATIONS
Indicators of sustainability
The relationships between the pro-environmental scales (pro-
environmental thinking, home pro-environmental behavior and
work pro-environmental behavior,) were positive, moderate-
to-strong, and signiﬁcant (see Table 4). However, they were
not too strong, which suggests a degree of independence
among the scales. The relationship between pro-environmental
thinking and pro-environmental behavior differed according
to context. A larger proportion of variance was explained
by the correlation between pro-environmental thinking and
home pro-environmental behavior compared with work pro-
environmental behavior (52 vs. 30%). A William’s t-test for
non-independent correlations was used to compare the dif-
ference in strength for each correlation and showed this dif-
ference to be signiﬁcant [tobt(323) = 5.83, p < 0.05]. This
suggests that the relationship between pro-environmental think-
ing and home behavior was stronger. The relationship between
home and work pro-environmental behavior was also reliable
(explained variance = 52%). This suggests that there was a
degree of shared variance in pro-environmental behavior between
contexts, but still a large proportion of variance that is not
explained by people’s cognitions and thus is attributable to other
factors.
FIT variables and sustainability indicators
The relationships between FIT Integrity and the pro-
environmental thinking and pro-environmental behavior scales
were positive and signiﬁcant (r = 0.21). The relationships
were weak and explained a small proportion of the variance
(4.4, 3.2, and 4.4% for pro-environmental thinking, home
behavior and work behavior, respectively). Further analysis of
each Constancy showed that Awareness was positively related
to pro-environmental thinking (r = 0.16) but not performance
of pro-environmental behaviors. The Balance Constancy posi-
tively related to pro-environmental behaviors performed at home
(r = 0.11). Conscience was positively correlated with all three
pro-environmental indicators (for pro-environmental thinking,
r = 0.20; for home pro-environmental behavior, r = 0.14;
for work pro-environmental behavior, r = 0.19). Fearless-
ness was positively related to performance of pro-environmental
behavior at home (r = 0.12). The Self-Responsibility Con-
stancy was related to pro-environmental thinking (r = 0.11).
There were no relationships between Behavioral Flexibility
and either pro-environmental thinking or pro-environmental
behavior whether at home or at work (r ranged from 0.01
to 0.05).
Following on, partial correlations were conducted to explore
whether the relationship between FIT Integrity and pro-
environmental behavior was direct or was mediated by strength
of pro-environmental thinking. The relationships between FIT
Integrity and pro-environmental behavior performed at home
and work whilst controlling for pro-environmental thinking were
found to be non-signiﬁcant [rpartial(235) = 0.02, p = 0.69;
rpartial(235) = 0.12, p = 0.07, respectively]. This suggests that
the relationship between FIT Integrity and pro-environmental
behavior was indirect and somewhat dependent on strength of
pro-environmental thinking.
Table 4 | Intercorrelations amongst the pro-environmental and FIT Profiler scales (N = 325).
Scale 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
(1) Thinking –
(2) Home behavior 0.72** –
(3)Work behavior 0.55** 0.72** –
(4) Integrity 0.21** 0.18* 0.21** –
(5) Awareness 0.16** 0.09 0.07 0.53** –
(6) Balance 0.08 0.11* 0.09 0.52** 0.02 –
(7) Conscience 0.20** 0.14* 0.19** 0.60** 0.27** 0.03 –
(8) Fearlessness 0.03 0.12* 0.10 0.49** –0.05 0.24** –0.05 –
(9) Self-responsibility 0.11* 0.06 0.08 0.64** 0.28** 0.18** 0.23** 0.26** –
(10) Behavioral Flexibility 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.10 0.06 –0.04 0.08 0.04 –
**p < 0.01; *p < 0.05.
Thinking, pro-environmental thinking; Home bvr, home pro-environmental behavior; Work bvr, work pro-environmental behavior; S-Responsibility, Self-Responsibility;
B-Flex, Behavioral Flexibility.
www.frontiersin.org November 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 1294 | 11
Page and Page Climate change: Do Something Different
DISCUSSION
This study was the ﬁrst to undertake an empirical investigation
of the relationships between FIT variables and pro-environmental
activity. It was a preliminary study. We used the FIT framework
(Fletcher and Stead, 2000), a non-conventional framework that
has received rather less empirical investigation than many other
frameworks relating to behavior and behavior change. By tak-
ing this approach we wanted to test the possible relevance of a
new theory of pro-environmental action and identify the personal
characteristics that might support individuals in engaging with
sustainability issues both cognitively and behaviorally.
The limited empirical research that already exists has explored
the FIT framework in relation to health-related outcomes, speciﬁ-
cally weight loss, stress, and family functioning (see Fletcher et al.,
2011; Sharma, 2011). The research presented here has begun to
elucidate the value of the FIT framework in a very different and
timely domain – engagement with pro-environmental activity.
Speciﬁcally, there were reliable relationships between the FIT
Constancies and the measures of pro-environmental thinking
and behavior. The relationships with pro-environmental behavior
were mediated by an individual’s cognitive engagement with pro-
environmental activity. In contrast, there were no relationships
with Behavioral Flexibility. It is, however, noteworthy that the
Behavioral Flexibility scores were low and did not extend beyond
the mid-point of the scale.
The pattern of results tentatively indicates that personal FIT-
ness levels do relate to an individual’s cognitive and behavioral
engagement with pro-environmental activity. The mediated rela-
tionship between the FIT Constancies and pro-environmental
behavior suggests that sustainability is both a psychological and
a behavioral problem. In relation to these results, we suggest that
thosemodels that seek to explain pro-environmental behavior, and
those that seek to encourage pro-environmental behavior change,
should consider both the cognitive and behavioral dimensions
of sustainability simultaneously and equally, rather than placing
signiﬁcant emphasis on one dimension at the detriment of the
other.
In some ways, the FIT framework does allow us to look at both
the cognitive and the behavioral characteristics that might relate
to pro-environmental activity. The relationships found in our pre-
liminary study suggest that an individual’s cognitive Constancies
are more inﬂuential than their degree of Behavioral Flexibility in
determining current pro-environmental behavior. This does not
mean, though, that being behaviorally ﬂexible is unimportant or
that behavior change approaches should only focus on developing
people’s cognitive engagement. Speciﬁcally, we have only shown
here that Behavioral Flexibility does not correlate with established
patterns of pro-environmental thinking or behavior. In retrospect,
we perhaps should not have been too surprised by this. It may
just indicate that people behave fairly habitually, whether or not
their habits are pro-environmental. Indeed, the low distribution
of Behavioral Flexibility scores suggests general patterns of behav-
ior are fairly ﬁxed. If this is the case more generally, then it will
be important to focus interventions on enhancing the Behavioral
Flexibility of the habitually “non-green,” leaving the habitu-
ally “green” to continue in their largely sustainable behavioral
routines.
We have already discussed how habits can support pro-
environmental behaviors. It seems counterintuitive to disrupt the
behavior patterns of those individuals who are habitually sus-
tainable in their approach, simply to make them more ﬂexible.
They have, after all, established patterns of behavior that are
pro-environmental. What we are suggesting, therefore, is that a
sufﬁcient level of Behavioral Flexibility might be more important
for supporting individuals to change behavior to become more
pro-environmental, than it is for them tobepro-environmentalper
se. This would suggest that enhancing Behavioral Flexibility might
make it easier to turn non-green behaviors to green, a hypothesis
that deserves further investigation. The purposeful development
of Behavioral Flexibility might be a necessary pre-cursor to sup-
port individuals who are habitually non-green toward a more
pro-environmental disposition and more sustainable behaviors.
Whether, in the pursuit of more sustainable behaviors, it will
be necessary to target interventions at enhancing the cognitive
Constancies, is an open question. Although enhanced cognitive
Constancies were associated here with more pro-environmental
thinking and behavior, it is just as possible that a change
in behavior can prompt a change in thinking, as vice versa.
The FIT framework (Fletcher and Stead, 2000) emphasizes the
bi-directional relationship between people’s cognitions and their
behavior, and the DSD behavior change approach associated with
the FIT framework seeks to direct development in both areas.
The FIT-DSD approach targets cognitions and behaviors both
directly and indirectly through a structured change process
based on habit reversal and (new) habit rehearsal. The indi-
rect approach of the DSD intervention is characterized by an
action-oriented stance in relation to change; it works by target-
ing behavior directly to leverage indirect changes in thinking.
Speciﬁcally, the DSD approach encourages people to experiment
with new behaviors, to try new and different ways of behaving
in order to become more ﬂexible. This, it is suggested (Fletcher
and Stead, 2000), helps to expand the size of the behavioral
repertoire. Through experimenting with new behaviors, peo-
ple might be better equipped to weaken their existing habits
(characterized by Fletcher and Stead as “habit-webs”) and also
encounter new experiences that could challenge current thinking
(see Page and Page, 2011).
In consideration to the powerful role of habit in cognition and
behavior, and in separating behaviors from cognition (Klöckner
and Blöbaum, 2010) and intention (Armitage and Conner, 2001),
the FIT-DSDmodel of behavior change targets behavior directly by
getting people to act out new behaviors rather than getting them
to think about performing these. This might help to overcome
(by rendering them irrelevant) the value-action gap (Blake, 1999)
and the thinking-action gap that are so often evident in efforts
toward pro-environmental behavior change. At the same time,
therefore, the FIT approach challenges the ‘thinking trap’ (Fletcher
and Pine, 2013) of researchers who tend to overestimate the power
of thinking and hence to underestimate the power of actions.
There have been some practical applications of the FIT Frame-
work to a range of psychological and social outcomes including
stress, weight loss, and family functioning (Fletcher and Stead,
2000; Fletcher et al., 2011; Sharma, 2011). Taking weight-loss as
an example, the DSD approach invites participants to engage in a
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structured programof doing something different on a regular basis
for a set period of time. Across the time period of the intervention,
the focus is on the development and performance of new behav-
iors. Importantly, these habit reversal and habit rehearsal tasks are
not necessarily focused on the behavior that is the target of change.
For example, in a weight-loss intervention, there is no necessity for
all, or for even a majority of, the novel behaviors to have anything
to do with food and exercise. The driving credo is that habits are
not independent from one another, but exist in a mutually sup-
porting network of habit-webs (cf. Neal et al., 2006) and routines.
By breaking down the distal habits (the ﬁxed routines of daily
life) that form the habit-web in which the proximal target habits
(e.g., overeating) reside, the DSD programme seeks to enhance
generic ﬂexibility. It seeks to put people into a (psychological)
place in which they can change anything about themselves, before
attempting to change any particular habit. As such, it comprises
behavioral experiments at a generic level, designed to reinforce
the belief that ﬂexibility and change are a deﬁning feature of a true
comfort zone.
But why might this approach be an appropriate alterna-
tive model of behavior and a practical framework for pro-
environmental behavior change? Inmanyways pro-environmental
behavior change presents a very different challenge for the FIT
Framework and the DSD approach from those to which it has
previously been applied. One obvious distinction concerns the
personal relevance of the target outcome. It is easy to see why
someone might subscribe to a target outcome that sees them los-
ing weight, but less easy, perhaps, to see why someone who is not
already cognitively predisposed would set sustainability as a target
outcome. Another distinction concerns the number of different
changes that are required to enhance the sustainability of indi-
vidual lifestyles, and the required perseverance of these changes
across multiple contexts and in the presence of different pres-
sures, e.g., competing social norms. These characteristics make
pro-environmental lifestyle change a particularly challenging goal
on which to focus.
Based on the results of our preliminary research, there is the
possibility that the FIT framework and associated DSD approach
might offer a useful alternative perspective on pro-environmental
action. The approach offered by the FIT framework is, by nature,
generic, and has applicability to many different behavior types. It
offers a different perspective on the personal characteristics that
relate to pro-environmental activity and deliberately steers clear
of some of the habits that researchers are starting themselves to
develop in their efforts to come to a better understanding of pro-
environmental behavior.
We are well aware that even this preliminary study is not with-
out its limitations. As noted previously, the data were self-reported
and included only individuals’ perceptions of their environmental
activities and levels of Behavioral Flexibility rather than objec-
tive measures. This raises potential limitations with regards to the
accuracy of self-report data and the inﬂuence of self-serving bias
(Schwarz, 1999), particularly in relation to the performance of sus-
tainable actions in home and work contexts. Objective measures
of both pro-environmental behavior and of Behavioral Flexibil-
ity are much more desirable and would, of course, offer a more
reliable outcome (Huffman et al., 2014). It is, however, difﬁcult
to imagine a truly objective measure of Behavioral Flexibility that
would not place enormous practical demands in terms of observ-
ing a given individual behaving in a variety of different contexts
over time. The practicalities of such observation would render
it unlikely that we could collect sufﬁcient data to infer corre-
lations and to analyze patterns in behavior. Objective measures
of pro-environmental activities are more feasible, in as much as
they can be extrapolated from proxy measures such as energy
use, waste produced, travel modality and mileage, etc. However,
as it was our intention to simply demonstrate the possible rel-
evance of a new theory of pro-environmental action, then we
think that self-reported data is sufﬁcient in this instance. Many
other studies in the area have employed similar methods (see
Abrahamse et al., 2005; Osbaldiston and Schott, 2012).
We hope that the moderate sample size offers some reassurance
that the results have a degree of validity and reliability. However,
the relationships that we have evinced between FIT variables and
pro-environmental activity are correlational rather than causal
and, moreover, exhibit statistical relationships of only modest
strength. We did not measure the relationships between alterna-
tive behavioral frameworks and theories and pro-environmental
action, principally owing the large number of disparate measures
that these alternative frameworks entail. We are not able to judge
directly, therefore, the value of the FIT framework in comparison
to other models. Nonetheless, based on these preliminary results,
we can see that there is potential to explore further relationships
between the FIT framework and pro-environmental activity in
a more systematically comprehensive and validated way, and to
consider further the value of the DSD approach in relation to pro-
environmental behavior change. Our next steps, therefore, will
be to undertake further empirical exploration of the relationship
between FIT variables and pro-environmental activity in different
samples and to compare these with the relationships between pro-
environmental action and other psychological variables derived
from alternative theories of behavior. By, we hope, conﬁrming
the statistical robustness of the relationships reported here, and
by further exploring the value of the FIT framework in promot-
ing practical action, we aim to encourage a degree of eclecticism
in the psychological approaches to pro-environmental behavior
change.
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